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We show how an epistemology informed by cognitive science 
promises to shed light on an ancient problem in the 
philosophy of mathematics: the problem of exactness. The 
problem of exactness arises because geometrical knowledge is 
thought to concern perfect geometrical forms, whereas the 
embodiment of such forms in the natural world may be 
imperfect. There thus arises an apparent mismatch between 
mathematical concepts and physical reality. We propose that 
the problem can be solved by emphasizing the ways in which 
the brain can transform and organize its perceptual intake.  It 
is not necessary for a geometrical form to be perfectly 
instantiated in order for perception of such a form to be the 
basis of a geometrical concept. 
Keywords: geometrical knowledge; philosophy of 
mathematics; perception and mathematics; visualization 
Mathematical Knowledge 
The dominant problem in the epistemology of mathematics 
for many decades has been to give a naturalistic account of 
mathematical knowledge.  Such naturalistic account will 
inevitably draw on cognitive science and what it shows 
about how the brain does mathematics. The major obstacle 
to giving such an account has been the assumption that 
mathematical objects are abstract. Philosophers do not 
completely agree on the notion of what it is for an object to 
be abstract. The truth may well be that ‘abstract object’ is a 
cluster concept that is largely defined by opposition to 
features associated with ‘concrete object’.  In the western 
philosophical tradition starting with ancient Greek 
philosophy, the notion of an abstract object does have a 
paradigm: the Platonic form.  Platonic forms are ideals that 
exist in an intelligible realm, outside of the concrete, 
material spatiotemporal order. 
These considerations suggest that the contrast between 
abstract and concrete objects is captured by the following:  
 
Table 1: The  contrast between abstract and concrete 




Particular? Some Yes (usually) 
Causally active? No (?) Yes 
Material No Yes 
 
As is evident from Table 1, abstract objects are typically 
defined negatively by contrast with concrete objects. There 
is no consensus as to whether abstract objects must be 
singular objects (particulars) or universals.  Frege, for 
example, treats numbers as both particular objects and as 
abstract objects.  By contrast, mathematical structuralists 
treat mathematical patterns as universals rather than 
particulars.  
In contemporary metaphysics and epistemology, abstract 
objects are usually thought to be causally inactive on the 
grounds that efficient causal action requires location in the 
spatiotemporal order.  If mathematical objects are abstract-- 
in the traditional sense captured in Table 1-- then it follows 
that they are causally inert.  Benacerraf (1973) in his classic 
paper, ‘What is Mathematical Truth?’ points out that it is 
extremely mysterious how knowledge of abstract objects is 
possible.  Our best naturalistic theory of knowledge appears 
to be—at least at a base level—to involve a causal condition 
on knowing.  That is, generally we think that if a subject S 
knows that p (for some proposition p), then there must be a 
causal chain that connects S suitably with the fact that 
makes p true.  This fact—the truthmaker for p—must be 
realized in the natural, spatiotemporal world somewhere. If 
mathematical objects are abstract, then the truthmakers for 
mathematical truths will not lie in the natural realm.  This 
would be a clear violation of naturalism, which D.M. 
Armstrong helpfully characterizes as the view that ‘space-
time is all there is’ (Armstrong 1997:5). 
Benacerraf’s problem is posed as a problem for realists 
about abstract objects.  Such realists believe abstract objects 
entities exist independently of the human mind and that 
statements about them have a determinate truth-value even 
if that truth-value is yet to be discovered.  To be sure, it is 
only a problem for realists about abstracta who feel the pull 
of naturalism.  Thus, although Benacerraf’s objection is 
posed as a problem for ‘Platonism’  in the generic sense of 
‘realism about abstract objects’, it need not apply to Plato’s 
realism.  
 Plato would not have granted the assumption that abstract 
objects are causally inert. Plato repeatedly speaks of 
concrete objects as ‘partaking’ or ‘participating’ in the 
Forms, which suggests at least a kind of one-way interaction 
between objects and Forms. Furthermore, Plato accepts the 
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principle that power to affect and be affected is the mark of 
reality, and holds that the Forms—despite being immaterial-
- are real.1  This provides Plato with an argument for the 
reality and power of Platonic forms. We may not accept the 
argument, but it is highly plausible that Plato did view his 
Forms as having some kind of causal power (Fine 2003).2 
The problem, then, is not that Plato’s forms lack causal 
power, but that the notion of efficient causality which is our 
contemporary scientific notion does not apply to the forms.  
Plato’s realism is incompatible with scientific naturalism.  
If we are to be naturalists, how then do we solve the 
Benacerraf problem for mathematics? Hartry Field 
(1989:25) points out that the Benacerraf problem survives 
even an  objection to the causal theory of knowledge.  The 
Benacerraf problem can be re-instated using the reigning 
epistemological theory, such as reliabilism.  According to 
one version of reliabilism, if S knows that p, then there must 
be a reliable connection between the subject S and the fact 
that makes p true. Once again, the problem arises that there 
is no explanation for a subject’s reliable connection to facts 
about abstract objects.  
Nominalism is the view that there are no abstract objects. 
However, nominalism is not an attractive solution to the 
Benacerraf problem. Putnam (1971) argued persuasively 
that nominalism lacks the resources—the notion of a 
linguistic type, which is after all a universal that transcends 
its concrete instantiations--- to articulate its very doctrine. 
Aristotelian realism recommends itself as a variety of 
realism suitable for naturalism. In contemporary 
metaphysics, the position of Aristotelian realism is 
represented by D.M. Armstrong’s theory of universals, 
which holds that they are immanent in the world.  Applied 
to mathematics, Aristotelian realists hold that many basic 
mathematical entities (patterns, properties, facts, and 
objects) are instantiated in the natural world.  As a 
consequence of this metaphysics, Aristotelian realism 
promises to give a naturalistic account of mathematical 
knowledge.  On this account mathematical knowledge is 
grounded in perception of patterns (universals) in the world.  
A major obstacle to locating mathematical patterns in the 
world is that, at least in some cases, the patterns do not 
appear to be there exactly. There seems to be a ‘mismatch’ 
                                                           
1 Plato entertains this line of thought in the Sophist at  247E.  
See F. Cornford (trans.), (1957). Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: 
The Theateatus and Sophist of Plato, New York: Macmillan, 234.  
The principle has been called ‘the Eleatic Principle’ in 
contemporary literature on the grounds that Plato has the Eleatic 
stranger enunciate it.  However, there is no reason to think that 
Plato did not accept it.  
In contemporary metaphysics one is more likely to find the 
Eleatic principle—that to be real is to have causal power—used as 
an argument against the existence of abstract objects (as in 
Armstrong 1997: 41). 
2 Rosen (2009) suggests that the distinction between abstract and 
concrete does not go back to Plato’s philosophy, but probably 
originates with Locke’s transposition of the grammatical 
distinction between abstract terms (like ‘whiteness’) and concrete 
terms (‘white’) onto the realm of ideas. 
between the perfect mathematical form and what is found 
(perceived, constructed) in the physical world. This problem 
is known as ‘the problem of exactness’ and it constitutes a 
major objection to Aristotelian realism.3 Of course one 
possible solution to the problem is to give up the philosophy 
that generates it.  However, it may be possible to retain the 
spirit of Aristotelian realism and naturalism while solving 
the problem. That is what we will suggest. We distinguish 
between three ways to solve the problem: 
(a) inexactness theory: that geometry is about the real 
shapes of things: a cartwheel doesn't have an exact circle 
shape, but it does have an exact near-circular shape, and 
one can explain why studying circles is relevant to 
studying near-circles; 
(b) the sub-perception theory, that there are perceivable 
shapes that are perceptually indistinguishable from perfect 
circles; 
(c) "rectification" theory: where the mind actively extracts 
the perfect from the visibly imperfect shapes of things. 
These three possible solutions to the problem can be jointly 
maintained and are mutually compatible.  In what follows 
we will especially emphasize solutions (b) and (c), although 
we should be understood to accept (a).  
The problem of exactness in ancient philosophy: 
Plato and Aristotle 
Plato himself was reluctant to locate mathematical forms in 
the physical, sensible world because the perfection and 
precision of mathematical forms seems unparalleled aby 
many of the real-world exemplars of mathematical forms.  
In the Phaedo, Plato notes that sensible, concrete objects in 
the material world often fail to instantiate the perfect 
mathematical forms found in the intelligible world of the 
forms.4  For example, at Phaedo 74a-c, Plato says that two 
sticks will not instantiate equality as perfectly as the form of 
the Equal itself. Presumably we cannot be sure that two 
sticks that look equal are actually equal, because our sense-
perception may not be able to discriminate between small 
differences in size. Plato regards judgements about 
mathematical form made on the basis of perception as 
inherently less precise and prone to inaccuracy.  
It is no accident that Plato’s examples are geometrical, not 
arithmetical. The problem of exactness seems to have more 
of a bite in geometry than arithmetic.  It is plausible to think 
that arithmetical forms are precisely instantiated.  For 
example, a certain flower has an exact number of petals, say 
five petals.  A certain book has an exact number of pages, 
such as two-hundred and twenty-nine pages.  Once a sortal 
concept is supplied, we can count out a precise number of 
units of an item that falls under the appropriate sortal 
                                                           
3 The related problem of ‘the perfect circle’ is discussed (not 
using the label ‘the problem of exactness’) in F. Copleston, (2003). 
History of Western Philosophy I, Ancient Greece and Rome, New 
York: Continuum Press, pp.297ff. 
4 Plato, (c.380BC), Phaedo. In J. Cooper (ed.), 1997, Plato’s 
Complete Works, Indianapolis: Hackett.  
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concept. In the case of geometrical forms, however, we deal 
with continuous variation of curves in (mathematical) space  
rather than with discrete differences in quantity. There 
seems to be plenty of scope for some patterns to fall short of 
ideal mathematical patterns. A table-top may not be 
perfectly square, as its edges may be bumpy.5 An artist’s 
drawing of a house, or a geometry teacher’s drawing of a 
triangle on the blackboard, may be imperfect but sufficient 
to convey the appropriate ideas to their audience. Perhaps 
some geometric forms will be perfectly instantiated, but for 
those that are not the problem remains to give an account of 
how the brain recognizes in the imperfect illustration the 
perfect geometrical form.   
Aristotle is well aware of the objection from exactness. 
He notes himself that a hoop in reality will not touch a 
straight edge normal to it just at a point as it is supposed to 
do in geometry:  
For neither are perceptible lines such lines as the 
geometer speaks of --for no perceptible thing is straight or 
curved in this way; for a hoop touches a straight edge not 
at a point, but as Protagoras said it did, in his refutation of 
the geometers…’ (Metaphysics B2, 997b34-998a6).6  
The philosophical problem, then, is that mathematical truth 
seems to be about exact mathematical objects with exact 
properties. Some idealization and approximation is involved 
in moving from the hoop of our everyday experience to the 
perfect circle of geometry.   
The problem with idealization is that it is not always 
truth-preserving.  If Don Quixote is in reality an old man, 
then his idealized conception of himself as a young knight is 
actually false.  Similarly, if the earth is actually a lumpy 
oblate spheroid and not a perfect sphere, then it is actually 
false that the earth has the properties properly attributed to a 
sphere (such as every point on its surface being equidistant 
from its centre). If we engage in mathematical deduction 
concerning perfect objects (perfect spheres and the like), 
then there is no guarantee that the result of the deduction 
will perfectly apply to anything in the real world! Yet the 
beauty of the Aristotelian view is that it supposed to offer a 
straightforward explanation of how mathematics applies to 
the real world, and how mathematical knowledge is 
obtained by learning about features of the world.  
Can Aristotelian realism survive? Some philosophers 
would say ‘No’. Stewart Shapiro regards the problem of 
exactness as a very serious problem for Aristotelianism and 
Platonism (Shapiro 2000: 70)  However, we still think the 
                                                           
5 The neo-Platonists blamed matter for failing to receive form 
perfectly in some cases. See Glenn Morrow (ed. and trans.) (1970). 
Proclus: A commentary on Euclid’s First Book of Elements, 
Princeton University Press, 1970, reprinted in 1992 with an 
introduction by I. Mueller.  
6 Similar passages: Meta VII.10, 1035a25-b. ed. J. Barnes, (1984) 
“Metaphysics” (based on a translation by WD Ross), The Complete 
Works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation,  vol. II, 
Princeton University Press. For discussion of the problem of 
exactness in Aristotle, see R. Pettigrew, (2009), ‘Aristotle and the 
subject matter of geometry’, Phronesis vol. 54.  
neo-Aristotelian view has a lot to offer (Franklin 2009). In 
what follows, we will focus on how cognitive science 
supports solutions (b) and (c) to the problem of exactness.  
Cognitive science to the rescue? 
 
Perhaps cognitive science can help us grapple with the 
problem of exactness. Giaquinto (2007) develops an account 
of the epistemology of mathematics that goes some way to 
solving the problem of exactness; moreover, he does so in a 
way that draws on the psychology of perception. In what 
follows here we endorse his solution to the problem of 
exactness and point out its limitations.  
Consider the perfect square. How do we get the geometric 
concept of a perfect square? Not by mere perception.  It may 
well be that we only come into contact with imperfect 
squares. For example, perhaps the squares in Susan’s 
homemade brownies (biscuits) are not really square. The 
edges are not perfectly straight, or the symmetry isn’t quite 
right.  Nonetheless, an encounter with merely imperfect 
squares may suffice for us to acquire the concept of a 
perfect (geometrical) square. This geometrical concept may 
in turn structure our perceptual experience so that we take 
ourselves to be experiencing a perfect square. As Giaquinto 
explains,  
It can also be part of experience that a square is perfect. 
Since there is a finite limit to the acuity of experience, 
there are lower limits on perceptible asymmetry and 
perceptual deviation from (complete) straightness.’ 
(Giaquinto 2007: 28).  
Asymmetry or other imperfections that fall beneath our 
threshold of perceptual discrimination will not be perceived. 
Call this view ‘the sub-perception theory’. The idea is that 
we can perceptually experience a perfect mathematical form 
even if objectively the form is not perfectly instantiated in 
nature.  Curiously enough our perceptual limitations enable 
us to experience, as it were, perfect geometrical forms. 
There is thus no need to be committed absolutely to the 
existence of perfect forms in nature: it is enough if the 
forms in nature approximate mathematical forms.   
To be sure, there are cases of imperfection that do not fall 
beneath the threshold of perfection: they are noticeably 
imperfect.  We can speculate that such cases—such an oval 
(rather than a perfect circle) or a shape that fails to be an 
enclosed triangle—are something that we can either learn to 
recognize as approximating a perfect shape but failing in 
some respect, or else we can learn to recognize them as 
perfect exemplars of some new kind (ovals rather than 
circles, for example). Reflection on such cases might make 
some philosophers conclude that the debate between 
Platonists and Aristotelians focuses too much on the notion 
of pre-existing ‘geometrical forms’ that are ready to be 
imposed on the world.  The aim of proper Aristotelianism, 
though, is to discover those forms already instantiated  in 
the world.   
Some allowance has to be made for imperfect 
instantiations of geometrical forms. We have suggested that 
an appeal to perceptual limitations can help the Aristotelian 
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to explain how acquisition and knowledge of geometrical 
concepts is possible.  
Another psychological phenomenon that helps in solving 
the problem of exactness is the ability to the visual system 
in the brain to organize perceptual scenes using gestalt 






When we look at these patterns, we seem to see an 
inverted and very bright white triangle covering a less bright 
upright triangle. The inverted triangle has illusory 
contours—its edges are not really there. Yet somehow the 
brain is tempted to see the bright inverted triangle as having 
edges of its own.  Perhaps the black lines of the upright 
triangle ‘spread’ or ‘smear’ a bit making the upright triangle 
appear to be a grayish white and therefore darker than the 
bright white inverted triangle on top.  The ‘top-down’ 
imposition of form of the bright white triangle depends also 
on lower-level perceptual phenomena, such as the visual 
system registering the dramatic shifts in colour across 
boundaries.7  The Kanizsa triangle is a good example for the 
philosopher of geometry to consider because it is a case 
where the brain interprets the visual display in a way that 
adds something geometrically to what is strictly speaking 
present in the given visual form.  
The implications of the preceding observations are that 
geometrical knowledge cannot be entirely a matter of direct 
perception of perfectly instantiated geometrical forms. That 
kind of naïve realism is too naïve.  Geometrical knowledge 
does involve an element of abstraction which allows the 
perceiver to move away from some of the imperfections or 
limitations inherent in a perceptual scene. Perceptual 
experience does not have to be completely veridical in order 
to trigger or give rise to geometrical concepts and, in due 
course, geometrical knowledge.  
If this account is right, then perceptual experience is not 
completely veridical, but it is not a hallucination either. Our 
perceptual concepts are formed in response to real objects 
with real properties which we perceive but whose flaws 
(deviations from ideal forms) we may or may not perceive. 
Our geometrical concepts are in turn closely linked to our 
perceptual concepts, abstracting away from the 
imperfections of some of the exemplars. 
 
                                                           
7 For more on perceptual completion, see L. Pessoa, E. 
Thompson, and A. Noe, Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1998) 21, 
723–802. 
A Dangerous Concession? In his seminal book, 
Mathematical Knowledge (1984), Philip Kitcher discusses 
the problem of exactness in relation to Kant’s constructivist 
philosophy of geometry. Kant’s view of geometry is that it 
is a rule-governed construction that makes it possible for the 
geometer to ‘discern the universal in the particular’ 
(A714/B742).8 That is to say, the geometer draws figures 
that represent universal geometrical patterns, and considers 
the features of those figures that would be common to any 
instantiation of the pattern. For example, if a teacher draws 
a triangle with white chalk, the whiteness of the chalk is 
irrelevant to the figure of the triangle. Only the purely 
geometrical properties are relevant: these are the angles and 
their total sum, the lengths of the three sides, and the 
arrangement of the sides in an enclosed figure. If the figure 
is used properly, these geometrical properties will be present 
in any figure of the triangle. Kant’s philosophy of geometry, 
as with any such philosophy that gives perception (intuition) 
a central role has to explain how the geometrical figure that 
is the object of perception possesses exactly the properties 
of the ideal geometrical concept. As Kitcher puts it, the 
problem is that “we cannot assume that mental perception 
will give us exact knowledge even of the particular figures 
we construct” (Kitcher 1984: 51).9 
How might a Kantian respond to the challenge? Kitcher 
suggests that the Kantian can appeal to the fallible and 
limited nature of our powers of perception. In particular, 
“We should concede that we might not be able to 
distinguish a straight line from a curved one” (Kitcher 1984: 
51). This response is essentially the same as the ‘sub-
perception’ view we found in Giaquinto (2007) and which 
we have endorsed as one solution to the problem of 
exactness. Kitcher goes on to suggest that this response is “a 
dangerous concession”, because it would destroy the a priori 
warrant (justification) for the geometrical belief. That is, if 
we acknowledge the limits and fallibility of our perception, 
we may no longer be inclined to trust perception as a 
reliable source for forming geometrical beliefs.   
We are not concerned here to defend the a priori nature of 
the justification of geometrical beliefs. However, we are 
concerned to defend the idea that geometrical knowledge 
can be obtained by having perceptual experiences.  Kitcher 
attacks both claims in a serious assault on the notion of 
mathematical knowledge. 
                                                           
8 We are indebted to Quassim Cassam for drawing attention to 
this quotation from Kant.  The quotation is from I. Kant, ‘The 
Discipline of Pure Reason’, in N. Kemp Smith, ed. (1911), 
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, London: Macmillan.  A 
crisp and clear discussion of Kant’s view of geometry is found in 
Q. Cassam (2007), The Possibility of Knowledge, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.  
9 We wish to acknowledge Giaquinto (2007) and Norman (2006) 
for putting us onto the problem of exactness, which is discussed by 
Norman (2006) with special reference to Kitcher (1984) in 
particular at p.121 as well. Our innovation is to illustrate the 
problem in ancient philosophy and to draw on psychology for its 
solution.  
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Kitcher’s objection is misguided.  Perception can still be a 
reliable source of geometrical beliefs even if there is not an 
absolutely perfect fit between the approximate instantiation 
of a form in reality and a perfect ideal geometrical form.  
What matters is that the process that takes us from 
perception of geometrical figures in reality to geometrical 
beliefs should be a reliable one. Reliability does not require 
complete identical replication of an image. Rather what 
reliability requires is this: for a given perceptual input X 
there is a reliable transform f(X) that takes us to the output 
Y, which is the geometrical concept, every time.  If 
background conditions are fixed, then perception can 
provide us with a reliable means of transforming perceptual 
intake into geometrical concepts and representations.  
 
Platonism by the back door? Someone might object to our 
view that it looks like Platonism by the back door. After all, 
we have admitted that in many cases geometrical forms are 
not perfectly instantiated in the world. We have also hung 
onto the idea that geometrical forms are perfect.  There 
seems to be nowhere to locate these perfect forms save in a 
Platonic realm.  This problem is just an aspect of the general 
problem of where to locate perceptual experience, with its 
Janus-faced nature, both pertaining to the conscious subject 
and pertaining to the objective world. Our account is quite 
opposed to Platonism in seeking to ground basic 
geometrical knowledge in perception rather than in 
communion with Platonic forms.  
It is worth noting that our account is neutral, though, on 
whether geometrical concepts are innate or acquired. There 
is some evidence that geometrical competence is shared 
across cultures, which may be taken as an argument for its 
innateness by some scientists (see Dehaene et. al. 2006). 
However, all that is required by our account is that 
perceptual experience—of some modality, not necessarily 
visual, but usually visual--- is a necessary trigger to the 
development of geometrical concepts.  Some indirect 
evidence for the necessity of perceptual experience in 
acquiring geometrical knowledge comes from studies of 
congenitally blind children.  The general consensus is that 
while congenitally blind children can acquire spatial and 
geometrical concepts through touch, they are delayed in 
proficiency of skills involving those concepts relative to 
their non-visually impaired peers (Millar 1994: 133). 
Presumably the explanation for this delay is that vision is 
one powerful but though not absolutely necessary means of 
acquiring geometrical knowledge.10  
Relevant Empirical Work in Mathematics 
Education 
Lastly we wish to draw the readers’ attention to some 
relevant empirical work in the field of mathematics 
education. Mulligan, Prescott, and Mitchelmore (2004) 
                                                           
10 For a summary of the research on blind children’s shape 
concepts, see S. Millar, Understanding and Representing Space, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994/2002.   
found a significant correlation between ability to recognise 
and draw geometrical patterns and subsequent early school 
mathematical achievement.11 
One of the interesting aspects of Mulligan’s work is the 
way in which her longitudinal studies have exhibited the 
growth and development of a grasp of pattern 
(‘mathematical form’) in young children.  For example, 
Mulligan’s data set includes the following set of four  
illustrations of a child’s progress in completing a simple 
geometrical drawing task: 
 
(i)         (ii) 
  
 
(iii)        (iv) 
 
 
[Figure 3] Taken from Mulligan’s ‘Understanding Young 
Children’s Difficulties in Mathematics Learning’, 
Macquarie University presentation, slide 24.  
 
Mulligan et. al. rightly interpret the illustrations as 
showing the emergence of an ability to grasp structure and 
attend to the geometrically relevant aspects.  
The relevance of this work to the philosophical problem 
of exactness is clear.  This data demonstrates that children 
learn how to focus on the geometrically relevant and salient 
properties of a figure and to disregard—‘abstract away 
from’—other aspects of the figure that may be interesting 
but not relevant for geometry.  For example, only in (iv) is 
there the right number of squares with the right number of 
edges and approximately the right symmetry.   
Drawing figures requires motor skills but also requires 
visual and spatial cognition. The development we see in the 
young children’s drawings reflects a refinement of 
geometrical concepts: from a sloppy experimental working 
concept to the final pure geometrical concept. The 
geometrical concept is an ideal and somewhat abstract one 
that appears to distance itself from the messy world of 
perception. The idea of ‘abstraction’ figures heavily in 
Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics and has equally 
been heavily criticized by Frege. Frege’s criticisms were 
immediately directed against John Stuart Mill’s crude 
empiricism in which a number was identified with a 
collection of ‘pure’ units (Shapiro 2000: 67). However, 
Mill’s empiricism is a descendant of Aristotle’s empiricism, 
                                                           
11 Mulligan, J., Prescott, A., & Mitchelmore, M. C. (2004). 
Children's development of structure in early mathematics. In M. J. 
Høines & A. B. Fuglestad (Eds.), Proceedings of the 28th annual 
conference of the International Group for the Psychology of 
Mathematics Education (Vol. 3, pp. 393-400). Bergen, Norway: 
Program Committee. 
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and Frege’s attack is an attack on the Aristotelian tradition 
as well.    
Here in the empirical work, in children’s drawings, we 
seem to have a demonstration of ‘abstraction’ at work.  This 
suggests that perhaps we should not be too quick to discard 
this useful concept under pressure from the towering 
authority of Frege. Mathematics educators continue to find 
the concept of ‘abstraction’ useful in describing the 
development of mathematical concepts. What seems to be 
occurring in such cases is not the replacement of an object 
with a pure unit (the target of Frege’s attack), but the 
omission of certain details and the emphasize on the 
structural (formal, universal) features of an object.  It is not 
at all clear that such mental abstraction is necessarily shown 
to be untenable by Frege.  
To be sure, we would not want to base our account of 
geometrical concept acquisition entirely on the notion of 
‘abstraction’.  However, abstraction may be one technique 
along with the others we have examined for generating 
geometrical concepts and beliefs. 
Conclusion 
 
A scientific, naturalistic account of geometrical knowledge 
has to begin with our ability to discriminate and recognize 
geometrical forms in the physical world. Such an account 
will give a central role to perceptual experience in triggering 
the formation of geometrical concepts.  
The problem of exactness is a two thousand year old 
problem.  The problem concerns a mismatch between the 
perfect geometrical forms we contemplate in geometry and 
their sometimes rough instantiations (as disclosed by 
perception) in the natural, physical world.  
We have suggested several different but compatible 
solutions to the problem of exactness.  First, we have 
emphasized that geometrical forms do not have to be 
perfectly instantiated without exception in order for 
acquisition of geometrical concepts to occur. Perception of 
such approximately instantiated forms can yield geometric 
concepts provided the imperfection is beneath the threshold 
of perception, or else is “abstracted away”. Second, as the 
gestalt psychologists emphasized, the brain plays an active 
role in organizing perceptual data according to gestalt 
principles. Thus, the top-down imposition of form may help 
to explain how the brain arrives at the notion of a perfect 
geometrical form out of the meagre materials of experience.  
Third, we have allowed that geometers can study irregular 
shapes in the real world while learning much from working 
with the tidy and regular patterns that figure in geometrical 
theory. Mathematics is an exact science, but the physical 
world and the process of perception is not exact.  What 
matters is that there is a reliable means of moving from 
perception to geometrical concept.  
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